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1. Introduction 
Authors who adopt free indirect style (FIS) are sometimes said to reveal or show the 
thoughts or ‘inner speech’ of their characters (see Chatman, 1978; Ehrlich 1990) rather than 
tell the reader what those characters thought and did.  The illusion that these characters are 
speaking is sustained by the use of so-called ‘expressives’ or ‘subjectivity markers’ (Banfield 
(1982; Fludernik 1993) which are associated with the communication or expression of 
thought or emotion – for example, the expressive words in (1a) (piffle and rot); the rhetorical 
question in (1a); the exclamative in (1b) and the reformulations and repetition in (1b): (the 
two excerpts are 25 lines apart and have been abridged slightly for purposes of presentation 
here):  
(1) (a) What was the matter with the man? This mania for conversation irritated Stanley 
beyond words. And it was always the same always some piffle about a dream he’d 
had, or some cranky idea he’d got hold of, or some rot he’d been reading 
…. 
(b) At that moment an immense wave lifted Jonathan … What a beauty! And now 
there came another. That was the way to live – carelessly, recklessly, spending 
oneself. He got to his feet and began to wade towards the shore, pressing his toes 
into the firm, wrinkled sand. To take things easy, not to fight against the ebb and flow 
of life, but to give way to it – that was what was needed…..To live – to live.  
(Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, 208) 
This characterisation has led to the question of how readers determine who is ‘speaking’ in 
fictional narratives (cf Genette 1980, 1988), or, in other words, whose ‘voice’ we are 
‘hearing’. However, any claim that we ‘hear’ Stanley Burnell’s voice in the first excerpt and 
Jonathan Trout’s in the second cannot be understood literally – not just because this would 
be to confuse writing and speech (cf Aczel (1998), but because neither character is speaking 
at all. This raises the first question addressed in this paper: how should we understand the 
notion of ‘voice’ as it is applied to the represented thoughts of fictional characters in 
narratives written in FIS?  
 In pragmatics, the term ‘speaker’ is often applied to anyone who is communicating 
using language, whether this is written or spoken. On this understanding, it might be thought 
that the term should be applied to whoever is attributed with the intention of revealing a 
character’s thoughts – the author (or constructed author) or narrator. However, it has been 
argued (e.g by Aczel 1998) that the narrator of a free indirect text is simply a ‘silent 
organizer’ who has no ‘voice’. This raises the second question addressed in this paper:  how 
do we accommodate the notion of a silent organizer in an account of communication, or, in 
what sense, if any, can such a figure be regarded as communicating at all.  
 The background for the discussion of these questions is the debate about the roles of 
pretence and attribution in free indirect style. This debate parallels the debate about the 
roles these notions play in the account of verbal irony. Thus those authors who take irony as 
a kind of pretence in which the speaker simulates the performance of a speech act also 
argue that the same kind of pretence or simulation of behaviour is involved in FIS ( cf  Currie 
2006; Kumon-Nakamara, Glucksberg & Brown1995; Recanati 2000, 2004, 2007; 
Walton1990). And within relevance theory it has been argued that free indirect discourse 
should be studied alongside irony as a variety of tacit attributive use which turns on the 
ability of speakers to use one conceptual representation to represent another by exploiting 
resemblances of content (Wilson 2006, Sperber & Wilson 2011). At the same time, however, 
Sperber & Wilson have argued that there are phenomena often referred to as ‘irony’ but 
which are better analysed in terms of imitation of public behaviour than in terms of the 
attribution of thought. This raises the question of whether the phenomena which constitute 
free indirect style might not also require a non-unitary explanation, and in particular, whether 
the voice effects achieved by so-called ‘expressive’ devices include both effects which are 
explained in terms of resemblances in content, and effects which are explained in terms of 
the simulation of behaviour.  
 This paper argues that there are, indeed, two types of voice effects achieved by the 
use of expressives in FIS. On the one hand, as I have demonstrated in earlier work 
(Blakemore 2008), repetitions and pseudo-repetitions (e.g. carelessly, recklessly, spending 
oneself in (1b)) provide a means of leading the audience to a concept which cannot be 
expressed by any one of these words but which provides a more faithful representation of 
the a character’s thoughts. At the same time, as I have shown in (Blakemore 2010, 2011), 
the relevance theoretic notion of procedural meaning (Blakemore 1987, 2002) can be 
extended to interjections (e.g. oh), expletive adjective phrases and epithets (e.g. bloody, the 
bastard) so that they encode procedures for activating representations of a person’s 
thoughts, thought processes and emotions (see also Wharton 2003a,b; 2009). On this 
account, the difference between the use of these devices in ordinary communication and 
their use in FIS is that whereas in the former they play a role in enabling the audience to 
construct representations of the communicator’s thoughts and emotions, in the latter they 
enable the reader to construct representations of a non-communicating (fictional) third 
person’s thoughts and emotions. In this way, they provide a particularly effective means of 
creating the illusion ‘of a character acting out his mental state in an immediate relationship 
with the reader (Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976: 438). 
 On the other hand, Sperber & Wilson’s account of metarepresentation also allows us 
to account for voice effects overlooked in Blakemore (2010, 2011), including those cases 
which have been described by Fludernik (1993) and Currie (2010) in terms of the (often 
exaggerated) ‘borrowing’ or ‘imitation’ of a character’s style for the purpose of caricature. As 
Wilson (2006) and Sperber & Wilson (2011) have shown, caricature or parody can be 
accommodated in their general account of representation by resemblance since this draws 
not only on the exploitation of resemblances between the contents of thoughts but also on 
the exploitation of resemblances in behaviour. However, we shall see that an author can 
exploit resemblances between the properties of utterances (or public behaviour) not only as 
a means of eliciting an attitude of ridicule, but also, as a means of evoking a sense of 
empathy.  
 The picture of free indirect style that emerges has implications for the role of the 
narrator of FIS style texts which seem to be inconsistent with the relevance theoretic 
analysis of FIS in terms of tacit attributive use (above). According to Sperber & Wilson’s 
account, FIS utterances are representations of the speaker’s thoughts about another 
person’s (character’s) thoughts (my emphasis). In the final section, I build on arguments 
suggested by my earlier work (Blakemore 2010) and develop a more fully worked out case 
for the proposal that although there are passages of FIS in which the use of expressives can 
be taken as evidence of the thoughts of the person responsible for the narrative, there are 
texts in which this is the exception rather than the rule, and expressives are associated with 
the perspective of a fictional third person. This suggests that such texts must be 
distinguished from other cases of attributive representation, for example, irony. At the same 
time, I shall argue that the idea that FIS is the product of silent organization (cf Aczel 1998) 
is compatible with a relevance theoretic account of communication, not only because it turns 
on the reader’s ability to identify both resemblances in content between thoughts and 
resemblances between formal properties of utterances, but because the ‘silent organizer’, 
like any communicator, is constrained by the aim of achieving optimal relevance. The point is 
that whereas in normal communication relevance is achieved by increasing the sense of 
mutuality between speaker and hearer, in free indirect discourse it is achieved by in the 
relationship that the communicator/writer creates between the reader and the characters 
whose thoughts are represented. 
 
 
 
 
2. Background: free indirect style, pretence and attributive use 
2.1 Irony and free indirect style as the simulation of behaviour 
According to Recanati (2007: 224) the speaker of an ironic utterance such as (2) or a free 
indirect thought report such as (3) ‘says something without actually asserting what she says 
or ‘makes as if to say’ (Grice [1989])’.  
 
(2)  [Henry is watching the speaker struggle with a large pile of books]  
You’re so helpful, Henry 
(3) Henry paused before he knocked on the door. He would be assertive. He would 
listen to what she had to say, but he would not let her walk all over him. 
Recanati (2007:226) argues that in both irony and free indirect discourse, we must 
distinguish the context of utterance (or locutionary context) from the context of assertion 
(illocutionary context), since in this sort of communication the two contexts do not coincide 
and the speaker who performs the locutionary act will not be said to have performed the 
illocutionary act. Thus in (2) and (3) the speaker is ‘endorsing the function of speaker and 
saying that p, while (i) not taking responsibility for what is being said, and (ii) implicitly 
ascribing that responsibility to someone else, namely, the person whose act of assertion is 
being mimicked’.  In this way, says Recanati, ‘the illocutionary act is not being performed but 
is merely being displayed, represented’ (2007:227). 
 In the case of (2) we might say that the speaker of (2) is simulating a public utterance 
which someone might have made. However, as Wilson (2000, 2006) and Sperber & Wilson 
(2011) have pointed out, it is not clear how this sort of account would accommodate those 
cases of irony in which the speaker is targeting a thought which has not been overtly 
expressed. Nor is it clear how the notion of assertion applies to private thoughts such as 
Jonathan Trout’s thoughts in (1b) above, or Linda Burnell’s thoughts as she sits with her 
baby son:  
(4) And what made it doubly hard to bear was, she did not love her children. […] Even if 
she had the strength she would never have nursed and played with the little girls. No, 
it was a though a cold breath had chilled her through and through on each of those 
awful journeys; she had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy – well, thank 
heaven, mother had taken him. (Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, 223) 
 
Recanati’s response to this is to say that since in all cases the act on display is an 
expression of attitude, the notion of assertion could be broadened so that it includes private 
acts of thought. However, while it may make sense to mimic a public speech act, it is not 
clear what it would mean to mimic a private thought.  
It might seem that instead of broadening the notion of assertion or speech so that 
encompasses thought, it would be preferable to focus on the way in which speakers use 
public representations (utterances) as evidence of their thoughts. Then one could say that a 
speaker who speaks ironically or produces an utterance in FIS is imitating or simulating an 
utterance that could be taken as evidence of a thought or epistemological position. In other 
words, the speaker is producing a representation of an utterance that someone would have 
made, had s/he voiced or expressed their thoughts. If this is right, then it seems we must say 
that in (4) Mansfield has provided a representation not of Linda thinking but of Linda 
formatting her thoughts for speaking.  
This would seem to be the implication of Walton’s (1990) version of the pretence 
theoretic approach to irony and free indirect discourse. Walton characterizes a speaker who 
is speaking ironically as ‘fictionally asserting what they would assert’ (1990:222), and a 
narrator who produces a free indirect representation of a character’s thoughts as fictionally 
pretending to be in the epistemological position of that character: 
‘Fictionally, the narrator speaks as though he himself were, in many respects, in the 
epistemological position he attributes to the character, reporting what he takes the 
character to know and remaining silent about what he takes the character not to 
know. In some cases we might understand it to be fictional that the narrator pretends 
to be in that epistemological position, as a way of indicating that the character is, the 
pretense consisting in participation in a game of make believe.’ (Walton: 1990: 379) 
However, notice that in imagining a character voicing her thoughts, an author is not 
necessarily imagining a character communicating her thoughts to an audience. When we 
read Mansfield’s representation of Linda thinking about the way she feels about having 
children, it is more like overhearing someone speaking to herself than hearing evidence of 
someone’s communicative intentions. Indeed, it seems that in contrast with direct thought 
reports, which are used to represent a highly verbalized flow of conscious thought, free 
indirect thought representations contain a range of devices – hesitation, self-interruption, 
sudden changes in direction, incomplete sentences, reformulations which give the 
impression of a character struggling to identify his /her emotions – which encourage the 
reader to interpret them as representations of unconscious thought. Thus Currie (2010) 
describes such representations as expressions of a point of view and argues that while 
people may use behaviour in order to express themselves overtly, ‘we are most inclined to 
think of behaviour as genuinely expressive of a point of view when it seems not to have been 
intended as so expressive’ (2010:91).  
 While Currie’s (2010) approach to irony is similar to that of Walton, he argues for a 
different sort of mechanism for free indirect style. Thus while he  describes the ironist’s 
pretence as being ‘at bottom, a matter of pretending to have a certain outlook, perspective, 
or point of view’ (2010:156), he argues that in free indirect style the narrator does not take on 
or come to occupy a defective point of view (2010: 130). Instead, the mechanism that is 
involved requires ‘a general sense of imitation which includes, for example, my uttering a 
sentence which you have never uttered, but saying it in a way which brings to mind your 
characteristic mode of utterance. By imitating some aspects of a person’s way of behaving – 
their ‘style’ as we say – I may manage to do something which is expressive of their point of 
view’ (2010:130). Thus for example, Currie suggests that by imitating Strether’s style of 
speech in The Ambassadors, James is able to communicate the frame of mind, or the 
disposition to approach the world which we suppose Strether to have (2010:132; for further 
analysis of Strether’s language, see Watt 1960). 2 
 The question raised by this account is what it means to say that certain behaviour is 
expressive of a point of view. More generally, it seems that in all these accounts, it is 
assumed that the speaker imitates an utterance (or public behaviour) which another person 
might have made and at the same time attributes an epistemological position or point of view 
to the person whose utterance is being imitated. This suggests that we need two 
mechanisms in an account of free indirect style: first, the sort of mechanism described by 
Recanati which enables speakers to perform a speech act without being committed to its 
illocutionary force; and, second, a mechanism which explains how this attribution is 
achieved.  
 
2.1   Attribution and resemblances in content 
Within relevance theory Wilson (2006) and Sperber & Wilson (2011) have proposed that 
their notion of attributive use allows us to by-pass the first mechanism in accounts of both 
irony and free indirect style. According to this approach, an audience who takes an utterance 
as evidence of a point of view does so because they understand it to communicate thoughts 
which are like the thoughts that someone with that point of view would have. As we shall 
see, the notion of resemblance that underlies this account is resemblance of content rather 
than resemblance of form. However, this notion of resemblance is part of a general account 
of meta-representation developed by Sperber & Wilson (1995, 2000) within the framework of 
their relevance theoretic approach to pragmatics.  
In this account, any sort of representation can be used to meta-represent another 
representation which it resembles. As Sperber & Wilson emphasize, resemblance does not 
mean reproduction or duplication. Thus even direct representations, which are often 
assumed to be identical to the utterances they represent, do not necessarily reproduce the 
original exactly. The utterance in (5) was heard in a reading of a story for children (BBC 
Radio 7): 
 
(5)  ‘Who said you could put your bottom on my chair’, he said – except he didn’t use the 
word bottom. (example from Blakemore 2010) 
And as Gutt (2000) underlined, translation and interpreting practice reveals many examples 
of cases in which the translation includes items which affect the hearer’s interpretation but 
which do not correspond to items in the original. For example, in (6) the interpreter’s addition 
of a discourse initial well would be considered to be appropriate even though the original 
contained no word that corresponded to it (example due to Berk-Seligson (1988:32). 3 
(6) (Defense attorney: What kind of house is that? 
Interpreter: ¿Que tipo de casa es? 
Defendant: Es una casa chica. 
Interpreter: Well, it’s a small house. 
Quotations and translations only resemble the original to some degree. 
 Sperber & Wilson (1995) and Wilson (2000) propose that resemblances between 
representations depends on the extent to which they share different sorts of properties. Thus 
while direct quotations exploit resemblances in formal linguistic properties, indirect 
quotations exploit resemblances at the level of semantic or implicated content. Thus both (8) 
and (9) could be uttered as indirect representations of the utterance in (7) on the grounds 
that they share logical and contextual implications: 
(7) I’m afraid I can’t see you today after all. 
(8) She said that she can’t see us today. 
(9) She said that she is too busy to see us today.   
Sperber & Wilson call the resemblances at the level of semantic and implicated content 
interpretive. Thus one representation is an interpretive representation of another to the 
extent that they share logical and contextual implications. The more logical and contextual 
implications they share, the greater the resemblance. However, the degree of resemblance 
that is expected will vary from context to context and will be determined by the assumption 
that the speaker has aimed at optimal relevance. Thus the search for optimal relevance may 
lead a speaker aiming to produce a summary of a book chapter or lecture to produce a 
meta-representation which shares only some of the logical and contextual assumptions of 
the original.  
Sperber & Wilson (1995) and Wilson (2000) claim that in any act of communication an 
utterance is used as an interpretation of a thought of the speaker. However, if this thought is 
about another thought, as in indirect speech and thought reports, the thought interpreted by 
this utterance is itself an interpretation of an attributed thought which it resembles in content. 
This might be a thought communicated by a particular person in the immediate or distant 
past; it might be a thought attributed to a particular person on the basis of some other kind of 
(non-verbal) behaviour; it might be a thought attributed to certain types of people or even to 
people in general.  
In some cases, they argue, the relevance of attributed use which achieve relevance 
by communicating the speaker’s attitude or reaction to the thought represented, or in 
Sperber & Wilson’s terms, cases of echoic uses of language. A speaker who uses language 
echoically may communicate a range of attitudes including acceptance, scepticism and 
rejection. If a speaker conveys a dissociative attitude towards a tacitly attributed thought, say 
Sperber & Wilson, then he can be said to be speaking ironically. Consider, for example: 
(10) Sue (pointing to Jack who has become a total nuisance after drinking too 
much wine): As they say, a glass of wine is good for you. (example from Sperber & 
Wilson 2011: ms 12). 
In some cases, however, the point of producing an utterance which is an 
interpretation of a thought which is about an attributed thought simply lies in the information 
provided about the content of the attributed thought. Indirect thought and speech reports 
achieve relevance in this way; however, according to Sperber and Wilson, so do tacit 
thought and speech reports such as (11a - b) and what they describe as the intermediate 
cases in (12a – b) (all examples are from Sperber & Wilson 2011): 
(11)  (a) An announcement came over the loudspeaker. All the trains were delayed. 
 (b) The passengers were angry.  When would they ever get home? 
(12) (a)  Would the trains ever run on time, the passengers were wondering. 
As Sperber & Wilson point out, such examples have properties which are said to 
characterize free indirect discourse (lack of subordination, shifted tense and reference). 
However, since the interpretive use of utterances is based on a resemblance in content, 
there is no need to say that a speaker who is representing another person’s thoughts in an 
indirect thought report is ‘fictionally asserting [or pretending to assert] what someone else 
would assert (cf Walton 1990:222 above).  Nor do we need to think of a speaker who 
communicates an ironic attitude towards private thoughts, wishes or fantasies as pretending 
to produce an utterance which is the one which someone with who had those private 
thoughts/wishes/fantasies would have made (cf Currie 2010).  As Sperber & Wilson (2011) 
ask ‘wouldn’t it be more parsimonious to bypass the pretence element entirely and go 
directly to the echoic account’ (2011:xx).  
 
3. Voice: the role of expressives 
3.1 The nature of expressive meaning  
Currie (2010), who uses the term ‘style’ to refer to those aspects of a person’s behaviour 
which are expressive of a person’s point of view – e.g. posture, facial expression, tone of 
voice – points out that ‘in a literary narrative the narrator has only language’ (2010:131). In 
fact, this is not true if we take ‘language’ to refer to the speaker’s linguistic system or 
grammar. Authors may use a number of formal devices to simulate prosodic properties of 
spoken utterances  - capitals to simulate emphatic stress, dots to represent pauses, 
hesitations and interruptions. None of these are part of the speaker’s linguistic system, but 
they may be used by authors in their representations of characters’ thoughts in free indirect 
style. Moreover, the expressive devices listed by Banfield (1982) and Fludernik (1993) 
include formal properties of utterances which are at the borderline of linguistics (e.g.  Linda 
Burnell’s ah in (13) (see Wharton 2003a,b; 2009 for discussion), and devices which, while 
they involve the use of particular linguistic patterns, give rise to interpretations which cannot 
be recovered by specific rules of interpretation – for example, the repetition and pseudo- 
repetition in (1b) (repeated below):4 
 
(13) Ah no, be sincere. That was not what she felt; it was something different; it 
was something so new, so … The tears danced in her eyes […].(Mansfield, ‘At the 
Bay’, Collected Stories, 223) 
 
(1) (b) At that moment an immense wave lifted Jonathan … What a beauty! And now 
there came another. That was the way to live – carelessly, recklessly, spending 
oneself. He got to his feet and began to wade towards the shore, pressing his toes 
into the firm, wrinkled sand. To take things easy, not to fight against the ebb and flow 
of life, but to give way to it – that was what was needed…..To live – to live.  
(Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, 208) 
At the same time, as we have seen, there are properly linguistic items whose meanings 
play a role in maintaining the illusion that characters are ‘speaking their inner thoughts’ 
(e.g. well and thank heaven in (4)) or whose meanings have a dimension which is not 
straightforwardly analysed in conceptual terms (e.g. rot and piffle in (1a)):  
(4) And what made it doubly hard to bear was, she did not love her children. […] Even if 
she had the strength she would never have nursed and played with the little girls. No, 
it was a though a cold breath had chilled her through and through on each of those 
awful journeys; she had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy – well, thank 
heaven, mother had taken him. (Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, 223). 
 
(1) (a) What was the matter with the man? This mania for conversation irritated Stanley 
beyond words. And it was always the same always some piffle about a dream he’d 
had, or some cranky idea he’d got hold of, or some rot he’d been reading 
Given this heterogeneity, one might wonder whether there can be a unitary account of 
expressive meaning in free indirect style. Perhaps, not surprisingly, no attempt has been 
made to provide such an account within linguistics or within literary stylistics (for further 
discussion, see Blakemore 2011). However, it seems that whether these expressive devices 
are properly linguistic, non-linguistic or at the borderline of linguistics, they have a property 
which might suggest that they cannot be accommodated in an account of free indirect style 
which turns on resemblances of content: it is extremely difficult to pin down the contributions 
they make in propositional or conceptual terms. Thus within relevance theory it has been 
argued that the meanings of words such as well, thank heaven, ah and no do not correspond 
to concepts (cf Blakemore 1987, 2002; Wharton 2003a,b; 2009), and that there are words 
with an expressive dimension of meaning which cannot be analysed in propositional terms, 
for example, the bastard, bloody, the poppet (cf Blakemore & Wharton (in preparation)). And 
as Sperber & Wilson (1995) have emphasized, devices such as repetition give rise to effects 
that cannot be pinned down in propositional terms. The question, then, is whether the effects 
of these devices can indeed be explained in the attributive account outlined above, which 
turns on resemblances in content, or whether they are more appropriately analysed in terms 
of the imitation of behaviour (cf Currie 2010).  
 In the following section I shall summarize work within relevance theory which shows 
that way in which these devices contribute to the interpretation of the utterances that contain 
them is not incompatible with an analysis in which they play a role in the representation of 
characters’ thoughts and emotions.5 However, in 3.3, I shall go on to show that expressives 
are not always used by authors for the purpose of providing faithful representations of their 
characters thoughts and emotions, but are also used as a means of simulating their 
character’s behaviour in a way which is analogous to the simulation of behaviour in parody 
(cf Wilson 2006, Sperber & Wilson 2011).  
3.2 Expressives and the representation of thought 
While it is clear that cursed makes a contribution to what is communicated by the utterance 
in (14), and the impatient Mr Hammond is not simply represented as thinking wondering how 
long the captain of the ship would stay in the stream, it is clear that we cannot pin down its 
meaning in the same way that we can in (15): 
 
(14) … the Lord only knew when that cursed Captain would stop hanging around 
in the stream. (Mansfield, ‘The Stranger’, Collected Stories 352) 
(15) He cursed the captain under his breath. 
The problem here seems to be of a different type from the one raised by metaphorical uses 
of the word, for example, (16):  
(16) At the time it had seemed a liberation, a chance to escape the heavy-bodied 
curse of the pill. (http://sentence.yourdictionary.com/curse) 
The problem here is that the concept communicated by curse is not one that is encoded by 
its linguistically encoded meaning, but is derived inferentially from the encyclopedic 
assumptions it triggers together with other contextual assumptions made accessible by the 
rest of the utterance (see Carston 2002, 2010; Wilson & Carston 2008). The problem in (14) 
is that cursed does not seem to communicate a concept at all, and in this sense it is more 
like the one presented by non-linguistic phenomena such as gestures, facial expressions 
and so-called ‘tone of voice’. Thus while it seems clear that a speaker who produces the 
utterance in (17) with an impatient tone of voice or with an accompanying thump on the table 
is communicating more than the proposition that the speaker is late, it is difficult to identify 
what this is in descriptive terms.  
 
(17) You’re late. 
 
The same sort of problem is raised by the expletive the Lord knows and the use of hanging 
around (rather than staying, for example). 
This analogy between linguistic expressives and non-linguistic expressive behaviour has 
been made by a number of authors (cf Kaplan 1997; Potts 2007a,b). In his review of Potts 
(2005), Bach 2006 argues that while the use of an expression such as cursed in (14) 
expresses a negative feeling, and that an audience can recognize that the speaker is 
expressing such a feeling, it cannot be said that he MEANS that I have that feeling. According 
to this view, then, the use of utterance of cursed is a case of showing or display, and should 
be excluded from what Grice (1989) would have called  MEANINGNN.  
However, Wharton (2003a, 2009) argues, there are behaviours which, from a Gricean 
standpoint, would be regarded as cases of natural meaning rather than MEANINGNN, but can 
nevertheless be deliberately shown, and hence used in overt intentional communication. For 
example, a spontaneous smile might be said to betray the speaker’s emotional state rather 
than communicate it. However, if a person overtly and deliberately allows the audience to 
see that he is smiling, then he may be said to be ostensively communicating this emotional 
state. In particular, one may use a natural behaviour such as smiling or thumping the table 
as a means of activating a specific procedure for the retrieval of a representation of a 
person’s emotional state. A similar analysis can be given for so-called ‘tone of voice’ (see 
Wilson & Wharton 2006), interjections which have been argued to lie on the borderline of 
language proper, for example, ah or oh (see Wharton 2003a, 2009), and words which in 
some situations are used for the cathartic expression of emotion, for example, damn or shit, 
(cf Jay 2000, Blakemore 2011) 
On this analysis, the only difference between the kind of phenomena discussed by 
Wharton & Wilson and Wharton and the phenomena being discussed here is that in free 
indirect thought representations interjections are used to activate a procedure for the 
retrieval of a third person’s (or character’s) emotional state rather than a procedure for the 
activation of a representation of the communicator’s emotional state. Consider Linda’s ah in 
(13):  
 
(13) Linda was so astonished at the confidence of this little creature …. Ah no, be 
sincere. That was not what she felt; it was something different; it was something so 
new, so … The tears danced in her eyes […].(Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected 
Stories, 223) 
 
Wharton’s argument that there are natural behaviours and linguistically borderline 
expressions which encode procedural information is an extension of Blakemore’s (1987, 
2002) proposal that communication involves the use of linguistically encoded procedures for 
utterance interpretation. Blakemore’s original proposal was restricted to linguistically 
encoded procedures for the recovery of implicit content – procedures encoded by discourse 
markers such as Linda Burnell’s well in (18) (extracted from (4) above): 
(18) As to the boy – well, thank heaven, mother had taken him. (Mansfield, ‘At the 
Bay’, Collected Stories, 223). 
According to this analysis, the reader need not assume that ah or well are constituents of 
utterances that Linda would have made. Their use can simply be understood as a means of 
encouraging the reader to derive a representation of Linda’s emotions, thoughts and thought 
processes. In the case of well we can say that the hearer is encouraged to access whatever 
contextual assumptions they believe would justify its use – assumptions which are then 
attributed to Linda even though they are not actually represented explicitly by Mansfield. As I 
have argued elsewhere (Blakemore 2010),  these are assumptions which would derive from 
the need to demonstrate that the baby’s presence does not detract from Linda’s claims to 
any lack of maternal feeling, or more generally, from the assumption that the answer to the 
question ‘what about the baby?’ is relevant. However, the main point here is that since the 
reader is given the responsibility for accessing these assumptions, he is left with the 
impression that he has accessed assumptions which are similar to those accessed by Linda, 
and thus contributes to the illusion that he is participating in her thought processes. 
Similarly, one does not need to assume that the narrator in (14) is imitating an utterance 
which has cursed as a constituent. In fact, one does not need to think of Mr Hammond as 
making an utterance at all. Such an expression contribute to the reader’s understanding of 
representation of a person’s thoughts and feelings in virtue of the fact that it encodes a 
procedure for the recovery of affective attitude information (see Blakemore 2011 for further 
information).  
The analysis of the meanings of these expressions in terms of procedures for the 
derivation of an interpretation of a character’s thoughts and feelings in particular contexts 
explains why their meanings are so variable and so contextually shaded. Thus the use of 
cursed may lead the reader to derive representations of emotions ranging from mild 
annoyance, through acute frustration, to extreme anger. As I have argued in Blakemore 
(2010), this explains why they play such an important role in creating the illusion that a 
character is acting out his mental or emotional state in an immediate relationship with the 
reader. The challenge for the author of such fiction is to produce public representations 
which enable the reader to identify ineffable aspects of the character’s mental state – 
emotions and thoughts which cannot be translated into a public language. Moreover, as we 
have seen, these expressions facilitate the recovery of representations of thoughts and 
emotions which are not represented explicitly in the text. The fact that the reader is 
encouraged to draw on his own imagination and interpretation of earlier parts of the text 
means that he ends up with most of the responsibility for deriving representations of a 
character’s emotional state. In this way, these devices contribute to an impression of 
emotional immediacy that could not have been recovered from a narrator’s description or 
interpretation of this state. 
Free indirect thought representations are frequently found in combination with indirect 
thought reports and direct thought representations. Clearly, expressions such as cursed, ah, 
and well are also used in direct thought reports such as (19) and (20) to create a similar 
sense of emotional immediacy. 6 
 
(19) ‘Well’, he thought, ‘It looks like the cursed man is not going to move’. 
(20) ‘Ah no’, she thought, ‘I should be sincere’.  
 
It is often claimed that this form of thought representation is modelled on the direct 
representation of speech, and allows the narrator to present what passes for a transcription 
or reproduction of the actual thoughts of a character (see for example Palmer 2005). In this 
sense, it could be seen as the representation of thought as it is formatted for speech, or what 
Palmer (2005: 603) describes as ‘the highly verbalised flow of self-conscious thought’. As we 
have seen, even the direct representation of speech cannot be assumed to replicate the 
original exactly, and there is no more justification for assuming that direct representations of 
thoughts are more mimetic than free indirect representations. However, as I have suggested 
above, it seems that free indirect thought with its use of incomplete sentences, hesitation, 
self-interruption, reformulation, rhetorical questions, and sudden changes of direction gives 
the reader a sense that that the thoughts that are being represented belong to the less 
conscious, less verbalized part of characters’ minds.  
 Is it really appropriate to describe expressions which perform this sort of function as 
part of a character’s voice? As we have seen, expressives can perform the sort of function 
just described without any sort of assumption that they are characteristic of the utterances 
that a character might make should she voice her thoughts. Thus we need not assume that 
they are representative of the character’s ‘style’ (cf Currie 2010, 130-1). This would suggest 
that while the term ‘voice effect’  captures the fact that authors use devices associated with 
communication for the representation of private thoughts, there is a sense in which it does 
not capture the function described in this section.  
3.3  Expressives and the imitation of style 
As Wilson (2006) and Sperber & Wilson (2011) have pointed out, the term ‘irony’ has been 
applied to a very wide range of phenomena not all of which can be treated in terms of 
attributive use of conceptual representations. In particular, they suggest parody is achieved 
by the imitation of behaviour, or of the stylistic properties of the formal properties of 
utterances which the speaker believes someone might have made. Consider the example in 
(21), where Thackeray’s fictional narrator borrows the voice of Becky Sharp in order to 
ridicule her:  
(21) About their complaints and their doctors do ladies ever tire talking to each 
other? Briggs did not on this occasion; nor did Rebecca weary of listening. She was 
thankful, truly thankful, that the dear kind Briggs, that the faithful, the invaluable 
Firkin, had been permitted to remain with their benefactress through her illness. 
Heaven bless her! though she, Rebecca had seemed to act undutifully towards Miss 
Crawley, yet was not her fault a natural and excusable one? (Thackeray, Vanity Fair, 
200, my italics) 
The underlined section of this passage is intended as a representation of utterances Becky 
Sharp (fictionally) made, but is not, of course, intended as an exact replication of her 
(fictional) utterances. The narrator is exaggerating or caricaturing what he considers to be 
the sort of effusive style Becky would use – the repetition, effusive adjective phrases (‘the 
faithful, the invaluable’), rhetorical questions, the false benediction – in order to mock her.  
This phenomenon has been described in terms of the imitation or borrowing of 
another person’s voice (cf Fludernik 1993:333), thus suggesting that this is a written version 
of the phenomenon described by Clark & Gerrig (1984):  
‘In pretense or make believe, people generally leave their own voices behind for new 
ones. An actor playing Othello assumes a voice appropriate to Othello. An ironist 
pretending to be S’ might assume a voice appropriate to S’. To convey an attitude 
about S’, however, the ironist will generally exaggerate or caricature S’s voice’ (Clark 
& Gerrig 1984:122).  
However, as Sperber & Wilson (2011) point out, research on ironical tone of voice suggests 
instead that speakers who engage in irony do not ‘leave their own voices behind’ or borrow 
other people’s voices, but rather use a tone of voice which indicates their own negative 
attitude. Thus Rockwell’s (2000) studies show that the significant indicators of irony are a 
slower tempo, greater intensity and a lower pitch level – cues which are related to the ones 
for contempt or disgust. Sperber & Wilson’s point is the phenomenon which they have 
argued is best analyzed in terms of echoic use, which itself should be analyzed in terms of 
the exploitation of resemblances in content, should be distinguished from parody, which is 
analyzed in terms of the simulation of behaviour. At the same time, they point out that 
parody can be combined with irony so that the exaggerated simulation of public behaviour is 
used to express an ironical attitude to the thoughts communicated by the behaviour being 
imitated. 
 In this section, I shall argue that there are so-called expressive devices in free 
indirect style which can be analyzed in terms of the simulation of behaviour rather than the 
representation of thoughts and emotions. As Sperber & Wilson have argued, this simulation 
is achieved by exploiting resemblances in form rather than resemblances in content. As we 
shall see, the simulation of a character’s behaviour may be used as evidence for the 
derivation of assumptions about a character’s character and behavioural traits - assumptions 
which he might store alongside other assumptions that are derived from other sources, 
including the representations of other characters’ thoughts and speech and the narrator’s 
descriptions of their behaviour. In some cases, these assumptions may include an array of 
weakly communicated assumptions about how ridiculous a character is, in which case, we 
treat the representation as a caricature. In other cases, however, the assumptions that a 
reader derives from the imitation of a character’s behaviour are simply assumptions about a 
character’s persona which we store for use in the interpretation of other parts of the text. 
Here I illustrate the different ways in which the imitation of behaviour can be used by 
considering, first, two examples from Mansfield’s ‘At the Bay’ – that is, the same source for 
the examples used in the preceding section in the demonstration that expressives are not 
necessarily used in free indirect style for the imitation of behaviour – and, then, examples 
from Mansfield’s ‘Mr Peacock’s Day’ where Mansfield’s intentions can be explained simply in 
terms of the imitation of style for parodic effect.  
 Consider, first, Mansfield’s use of the non-word nemeral to represent the children’s 
mispronunciation of the word emerald in (22) when Pip reveals his ‘find’ of what we 
understand is a piece of green glass polished by the sea: 
 
(22) “ Here, shall I show you what I found yesterday?” said Pip mysteriously, and 
he struck his spade into the sand, ….And his hand opened; he held up to the light 
something that flashed, that winked, that was a most lovely green. 
“It’s a nemeral”, said Pip solemnly. 
“Is it really, Pip?” Even Isabel was impressed. 
The lovely green thing seemed to dance in Pip’s fingers. Aunt Beryl had a nemeral in 
a ring, but it was a very small one. This one was as big as a star and far more 
beautiful. (Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, 216) 
Here the imitation of the mispronunciation in both the direct speech representation and the 
indirect representation of Isabel’s thoughts serves to underline the division between the 
innocent world of the children represented in this section (and, for example, section IX of the 
story), and the adult world represented in other parts of the story, particularly the world of 
Beryl, who is represented in other sections as dealing with considerably less innocent 
fantasies (see section XII). We are never told by Mansfield that Pip’s find is in fact glass: 
instead Mansfield depends on the childhood memories her readers and their ability to recall 
similar experiences. In this sense, the representation of the mispronunciation serves as a 
means of encouraging readers to bring their own memories of childhood to bear on the 
interpretation of the story for the derivation of a range of weakly communicated assumptions 
about the magic that children see in objects which adults regard as ordinary. Thus we might 
be amused by the representation of the children, but only in the same way that we are 
amused by memories of our own childish misconceptions and misperceptions.  
 The effect of the imitation of Alice’s (the maid’s) mispronunciation of kitchen in (23) 
also serves as a means of distinguishing Alice’s world from that of the other characters in the 
story, but does not invite the same sort of empathy.  
(23) “ Freedom’s best, “ said Mrs Stubbs again. 
Freedom! Alice gave a loud, silly little titter. She felt so awkward. Her mind flew 
back to her own kitching. Ever so queer! She wanted to be back in it again. 
(Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, 231) 
This is found is at the end of an episode which begins with following description by the 
narrator (abridged for purposes of presentation here): 
 
(24) The sun was still full on the garden when the back door of the Burnell’s shut 
with a bang and a very gay figure walked down the path to the gate. It was Alice, the 
servant girl, dressed for her afternoon out. She wore a white cotton dress with such 
large spots on it, and so many that they made you shudder, white shoes, and a 
leghorn turned up at the brim with poppies ….. and in one hand, she carried a very 
dashed-looking sunshade which she referred to as her perishall. (Mansfield, ‘At the 
Bay, Collected Stories, 228; italics are Mansfield’s) 
The use of italics in the representation of Alice’s mispronunciation of parasol, and the use of 
inverted commas around other items in representations of Alice’s vocabulary (“invite”, 
“manners”) in the narrative that follows, together with a caricatured description of Alice’s 
behaviour (“the manners” consisted of ‘persistent little coughs and hems, pulls at her gloves, 
tweaks at her skirt, and a curious difficulty in seeing what was set before her or 
understanding what was said’) provides a context for the interpretation of kitchin in (23) in 
which we are distanced from Alice and disassociate ourselves from the behaviour which is 
being imitated. 
The clue to Mansfield’s intention in her portrait of Mr Reginald Peacock in ‘Mr Reginald’s 
Day’ is in the name: although he professes that he cannot stand vain men, and that the thrill 
of satisfaction’ he feels when he sees himself in the mirror in the morning after dressing is, 
according to him, ‘purely artistic’ (Mansfield, Mr Reginald Peacock’s Day, Collected Stories, 
146), the reader knows from the very first paragraph that this is preposterous:  
(25) If there was one thing that he hated more than another it was the way she 
had of waking him up in the morning. She did it on purpose, of course. It was her 
way of establishing her grievance for the day, and he was not going to let her know 
how successful it was. But really, really, to wake a sensitive person like that was 
positively dangerous! It took him hours to get over it – simply hours. (Mansfield, ‘Mr 
Reginald Peacock’s Day’, The Collected Stories, 144, my italics) 
In contrast with the expressive language in the representations of Linda Burnell’s thoughts 
discussed in the previous section, this expressive language is used to simulate Mr 
Peacock’s behaviour rather than to encourage the reader to partake in an exploration of his 
emotional life. The repetition is used as a means of encouraging us to imagine the sort of 
person who would react to the process of being woken up in this way rather than a means of 
sharing Mr Peacock’s inner life, and the result is that we adopt an attitude of derision 
towards this sort of behaviour. 
 Indeed, it is not really clear that Mr Peacock has an inner life: he turns out to be all 
style and no substance. Thus we soon find out that he requires his rather baffled son to 
shake hands with him every morning; he delights in his own wit and elegance, performing 
even the simplest task as if he were on stage; and his claim that he cannot stand vain men 
follows a detailed representation of his exercise regime and toilette (including his concerns 
about getting fat), and is followed by the description of how flattered he is by a letter from 
one of his pupils. Thus it is not surprising that even when he experiences something 
approaching a genuine emotion at the end of the story and attempts to explain how he feels 
to his wife, he can only produce the formulaic repetition,  “Dear lady, I should be so charmed 
– so charmed” (Mansfield, Collected Stories, 153).  
It seems that the case for describing the phenomena discussed in this section in terms of 
the imitation of voice is stronger than the case for using the term ‘voice’ to describe the 
effects discussed in the preceding section. The mechanism involved in the examples 
discussed here mirrors the one Sperber & Wilson (2011) suggest is involved in parody. 
However, as we have seen, the point of imitating a character’s style is not always to 
encourage the reader to adopt dissociative attitudes towards this character: in some cases 
the reader’s interpretation will be based a cognitive environment which is assumed to be 
shared with a character or characters, or in other words, a sense of empathy.   
 
 
 
 
 
4. The role of the narrator in free Indirect thought representations 
4.1  Authors, implied authors and narrators 
According to Currie (2010:130), if I wish my imitation of your gait, dress, or verbal style to 
contain elements of caricature, I must exaggerate aspects of them while managing to 
present them as recognizably your own. This would suggest that the ability to recognize an 
imitation as a caricature depends simply on the comparison of actual behaviour (gait, dress 
or verbal style) as it is imagined by the reader and the exaggerated version provided by the 
author. However, the discussion of Mansfield’s portraits of Alice in ‘At the Bay’ and Mr 
Peacock suggests that the reader’s recognition that he is intended to find a character 
ridiculous is rather more complex than this. Thus the reader of (23) interprets Alice’s kitching 
in the context of a description of Alice’s clothing which ‘would make you shudder’ and which 
contains orthographic devices that suggest a certain distance from Alice’s language. And the 
repetition of simply hours in (25) is interpreted in the context of the representation of what is 
clearly an easily irritated, petulant man.   
 In this sense, the interpretation of the examples discussed in this section is not 
different from the interpretation of the examples discussed in 3.2: our interpretation of Linda 
Burnell’s thought processes and emotions in a passage such as (4) (repeated below) will be 
affected by our interpretation of earlier sections of the story, including sections written from 
the point of view of other characters;  the immediately preceding representation of Linda’s 
memories of her childhood and first encounter with her husband; by subsequent parts of the 
story (including those which represent the point of view of other characters); and, possibly, 
by our interpretation of other stories in which Linda features (e.g. ‘Prelude’): 
 
(4) And what made it doubly hard to bear was, she did not love her children. […] Even if 
she had the strength she would never have nursed and played with the little girls. No, 
it was a though a cold breath had chilled her through and through on each of those 
awful journeys; she had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy – well, thank 
heaven, mother had taken him. (Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, 223) 
 
In other words, the voice effects discussed in both 3.2 and 3.3 are the result not only of the 
use of expressive devices, but also of the fact that they are interpreted in the context of other 
parts of the fiction. 
The discussion so far would suggest that we must attribute the responsibility for 
selecting expressives and organizing the text in such a way that the appropriate contexts are 
available to us to Mansfield herself. However, as a number of theorists have pointed out, this 
view cannot be maintained: there are a number of reasons for saying that this responsibility 
cannot be attributed with the actual author (see Booth 1983, Cohn 1999, Aczel 1998, Currie 
2010). If we are to talk of the author, it seems that we must talk of what McHale (cited by 
Aczel 1998: 491) describes as ‘a constructed author-figure, a surrogate or ‘implied’ author’ 
(McHale 1983).  
 McHale (1983) assumes that this constructed author figure must be ‘functionally 
distinct’ from the narrator, arguing that he had been incorrect (in a previous article) to speak 
of the narrator as ‘the organizer and guarantor of meaningfulness’ because the ‘the narrator 
narrates’ while ‘the author organizes and guarantees meaningfulness’. If this view is correct, 
then it seems that we may be justified in banishing the narrator from free indirect discourse 
leaving the role of organization and selection to the constructed or implied author. However, 
Aczel’s (1998) argues that organization and selection are integral to the act of narrating, and 
that a narrator’s function cannot be reduced to that of ‘stenographer’ (cf Chatman 1978) or 
transcriber of a taped discourse (cf (Jahn 1983): ‘If all “the sentences of a narrative” are in 
some sense selected sentences, it becomes very difficult to conceive of a narrated discourse 
without a “selector”; and if narration, as a process, is itself impossible without selection, there 
seems to be little reason for banishing the narrator from third person narratives’ (Aczel1998: 
492). 
It seems that Currie (2010: 65 - 69) takes a similar view. There is, he argues, no 
distinction between narrative making and narrative telling. A narrative is made by someone 
with a particular communicative intention – an intention which cannot be attributed to 
Chatman’s stenographer or Jahn’s transcriber (above) 7 – or, as Currie puts it, to a postman 
who is responsible for delivering a letter containing a story written by someone else: ‘The 
postman will have knowledge, values, and an outlook, but none that sheds light on the 
narrative he delivers, since, by hypothesis, the sentences we read do not at all depend on, 
and are not expressive of these characteristics. We are entitled to think of them as 
dependent on or expressive of someone’s intentions only if we think that person the maker 
of the work. The author of the [story in the letter] is its narrator in the proper sense: the 
person whose intentions have to be understood if we are to understand what is being 
communicated to us’ (2010: 66). 8 
Now, according to relevance theory, an utterance is a public representation of the 
thoughts of the speaker, and a hearer who recognizes that the speaker is engaged in an act 
of ostensive communication is entitled to assume that any effort he expends in processing 
this utterance will be rewarded by an optimally relevant interpretation of that speaker’s 
thoughts. Within this framework, successful communication does not require the duplication 
of meanings. Since the linguistic evidence provided by the utterance may give the hearer 
varying degrees of responsibility for deriving an interpretation which satisfies his 
expectations of relevance, it is possible that he will use the utterance as a means for deriving 
assumptions which are not identical with ones envisaged by the speaker. However, as 
Sperber & Wilson (1998) say, this should not be construed as a failure of communication. 
Communication will succeed to the extent that it results in the enlargement of the mutual 
cognitive environment of speaker and hearer. 
 To what extent is can the act of producing a representation of a fictional character’s 
thoughts communication in this sense? The extension of this model to the representation of 
the thoughts of a fictional character would seem to suggest that we can attribute a narrator 
or ‘narrative maker’ with the intention of communicating that the effort expended by the 
reader will be rewarded by an interpretation of that narrator’s thoughts, or that the result of 
interpreting a representation of a fictional character’s thoughts is the enlargement of the 
mutual cognitive environment of the reader and narrator? To what extent is the reader’s 
interpretation of ‘Mr Peacock’s Day’ an interpretation of the thoughts of a narrator? Is the 
sense of mutuality the reader achieves when reading representations of Linda’s thoughts in 
‘At the Bay’ a sense of mutuality between that reader and the constructed author figure who 
we take to be responsible for constructing those representations and  the contexts in which 
they are understood? 
 
4.2  The narrator as a silent organizer 
Since the representation of a character’s thoughts recovered by a reader is in some sense a 
product of the imagination of the (constructed) author, it could be argued that the reader 
recovers a representation of the (constructed) author’s imaginings about that character, and 
hence that this representation enlarges the mutual cognitive environment of the reader and 
(constructed) author by providing evidence for the way in which that author’s imagination 
works. 
However, the question is whether there is anything in the story which can be taken as 
evidence of a persona who is actively helping the reader to recognize that this is his 
intention. Moreover, it has to be asked whether in producing evidence of his imaginings 
about a character, the (constructed) author is producing evidence of a persona who can be 
attributed with feelings and attitudes towards that character, or, in other words, whether they 
are producing evidence for a point of view which is distinct from that of the character(s) 
whose thoughts are being represented. 
This is clearly the case in examples of irony in which the echoed thoughts are embedded 
in the context of a text with an explicit first person narrator, or in the context of a text in which 
the narrator addresses the reader. Consider, for example, the non-literary example in (25) 
where the point of view represented by the italicized question is understood to contrast with 
that of the first person narrator: 
 
(26) I was struck by the willingness of almost everybody in the room – the 
senators as eagerly as the witnesses – to exchange their civil liberties for an illusory 
state of perfect security. They seemed to think that democracy was just a corporate 
word for corporate capitalism, and that the society would be a lot better off if it 
stopped its futile and unremunerative dithering about constitutional rights. Why 
humor people, especially poor people, by listening to their idiotic theories of social 
justice? ( Lewis Lapham, Harper’s Magazine, July 1995, cited by  Harris & Potts 
2010) 
Here the reader will understand the narrator to be communicating an attitude of scepticism 
towards the views echoed. In other words, this is a case of tacit attributive use which is used 
to communicate thoughts and assumptions which are expressive of the narrator’s point of 
view (see Sperber & Wilson’s analysis outlined in 2.1 above). 
 Now, this paper has focussed on the role of expressive devices as a means of 
providing evidence of a point of view. As Fludernik (1993) observes, fictional texts vary in the 
extent to which the narrator makes the reader aware of his/her presence. Thus nineteenth 
century fiction tends to contain more evidence of the narrator’s point of view than twentieth 
century fiction. This is not to say that there are not twentieth century texts in which the 
narrator/constructed author makes ‘authorial intrusions’ into representations of a fictional 
character’s thoughts (cf Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976). Even Mansfield, whose stories tend to 
betray few signs of a narrating figure, occasionally allows a narratorial comment. Thus in ‘At 
the Bay’ we recover an interpretation of Beryl’s rather judgmental thoughts as she watches 
the servant girl, Alice, walk down the road on her afternoon off, and then an interpretation of 
the more detached comment which cannot be attributed either to Beryl or Alice herself: 
 
(27) And where did a girl like that go to in a place like this. She supposed Alice  
had picked up some horrible common larrikin and they’d go into the bush 
together. Pity to make herself so conspicuous; they’d have hard work to hide 
with Alice in that rig-out. 
But no, Beryl was unfair. Alice was going to tea with Mrs Stubbs who’d sent 
her an “invite” by the little boy who called for orders. (Mansfield, At the Bay, 
The Collected Short Stories, 228, my italics). 
But the moment is brief, and we are quickly led into a new section in which events are 
represented from Alice’s perspective. 
In fact, the stories cited in this paper are examples of cases in which this 
phenomenon is the exception rather than the rule – hence the term ‘intrusion’. Thus even 
when the imitation of a character’s style leads us to view that character as absurd, as in ‘Mr 
Peacock’s Day’, there is no sense in which that the point of view of that character contrasts 
with that of the narrator. The interpretation we recover is not an interpretation of Mansfield’s 
thoughts about Mr Peacock. The person we hold responsible for the organization and 
selection of the material which gives rise to our identification of Mr Peacock as an absurd 
figure does this covertly, silently, so that we are left with the illusion of someone who is 
making himself look ridiculous. And because of this, we are less inclined to say that in this 
story Mansfield is ‘borrowing’ the voice of her imaginary character in order to communicate 
her thoughts about him. 
Similarly, while the use of expressives together with the selection and organization of 
material provides evidence for our interpretation of Linda’s thoughts in (4), her thought 
processes and her emotional state, the resulting interpretation is not understood to be an 
interpretation of what Mansfield thinks Linda is thinking, but simply an interpretation of what 
Linda is thinking. We are left by Mansfield to explore Linda’s mental life, using the 
expressive language as evidence for an illusion of the sort of affective mutuality that we 
might normally have with communicators in real life.  
In other words, in these stories, Mansfield/the narrator is showing us a character’s 
thoughts, thought processes, emotions and, in the case of Mr Peacock, style. And in doing 
so she is engaged in an act of intentional, ostensive communication. We can accommodate 
this in the relevance theoretic model of communication outlined above, if we decouple the 
responsibility for ensuring that the effort of processing the text will be rewarded by optimal 
relevance from the point of view that is being represented. Thus while the narrator is 
responsible for orchestrating our interpretation of free indirect thought representations, for 
selecting and organizing material in such a way that the effort of processing will result in 
optimal relevance, we do not necessarily assume that this function is being performed by 
someone who intends to communicate their own thoughts: the relevance of the act of 
narration may instead lie in the sense of mutuality that is achieved between reader and 
character. 
 
Conclusion 
This suggests that our understanding of these stories depends on the recognition that the 
author’s intention is to achieve what is impossible in the real world: to show another person’s 
feelings or thoughts in exactly the same way that they might show their own – through the 
ostensive use of natural behaviours, linguistic behaviours, borderline linguistic behaviours 
and the use of words which in other situations might be used for the cathartic, private 
expression of emotion. 
 This paper has argued that this intention is not always fulfilled in the same way. On 
the one hand, there are cases in which the use of expressive devices leads to the formation 
of thoughts which are understood to resemble other (attributed) thoughts. In other words, 
there are cases which suggest that the explanation of the way in which this intention is 
fulfilled turns on the ability to exploit resemblances between thought contents. On the other 
hand, I have argued that there are other cases in which the explanation of the role of 
expressives in showing the point of view of another turns on the ability to exploit 
resemblances between public utterances or styles. While some of these case fall within the 
class of phenomena classified by Sperber & Wilson (2011) as parody, we have seen that the 
purpose of imitating a style may be to evoke memories or assumptions which contribute to a 
sense of empathy with a character rather than a sense of dissociation.  
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is taken as evidence for people’s thoughts rather than a way of thinking (e.g. kinds of 
beliefs that people might hold or the sort of approach that they might apply to a 
particular problem.  Within the relevance theoretic framework of this paper, style 
refers particularly to those choices speakers make in formulating their utterances 
which reflect (and, indeed, sometimes communicate) their assumptions about the 
contextual resources and processing abilities of their audience (see Sperber & 
Wilson 1995:217-224 for further discussion. 
3. I am grateful to Fabrizio Gallai for this example. 
4. For further discussion, see Sperber & Wilson 1995; Blakemore 2008. 
5. In this section (3.2) I will focus on expressive devices which have been analyzed in 
terms of coded procedures for the recovery of representations of thoughts and 
emotions. For a discussion of how repetition and pseudo repetition (e.g. carelessly, 
recklessly, spending oneself in (1b) can be treated as contributing to the 
interpretation of thoughts, see Blakemore 2008. 
6. I am grateful to a Mind and Language reviewer for drawing attention to this point. 
7. It would be interesting to consider here whether we should also preclude translators 
and interpreters from this role. On the one hand, it could be argued that their role is 
simply to facilitate, and that the resulting translation is not expressive of their 
intentions; on the other, it could be argued that a translation is essentially an 
interpretation of the original (where this is understood in the sense defined by 
Sperber & Wilson 1995), and that our understanding of the translation is therefore in 
some sense dependent on the knowledge, values and outlook of the translator.   
8. As Currie points out, this is not to say that the narratives in stories – for example, 
Thackeray’s fictional narrator, Barry Lyndon or Dr Watson in the Arthur Conan 
Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories may not be unreliable.  
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